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FOR WHOM THE STATUTE TOLLS? NOT EVEN THE SACRED
HEART: FLORIDA CLASS ACTION JURISDICTION AND THE 
NEED FOR A SAVINGS STATUTE TO TOLL THE 
LIMITATIONS PERIOD
Laura Liles*
Abstract
Class actions are common litigation tools that plaintiffs use to 
efficiently adjudicate their rights. However, with the passage of the Class 
Action Fairness Act and the Florida Capacity to Sue statute, class 
plaintiffs could very quickly find their claims traveling from state to 
federal court, or simply being dismissed for lack of jurisdiction if 
originally filed in federal court. While this may not initially suggest an 
issue, CAFA and the Florida Capacity to Sue statute are creating 
tremendous traffic in federal courts. When considered with Florida’s 
strict application of the statute of limitations for class actions, a plaintiff’s 
limitations period may run while the lawsuit waits its turn to be heard in 
federal court. This Note explores the reluctance of both Florida and 
federal courts, interpreting Florida law, to apply any form of class action 
tolling, either through the American Pipe rule or equitable tolling, and the 
consequences of this choice on Florida lawsuits. While the court in 
Sacred Heart Health System v. Humana Military Healthcare Services 
came close to solving the tolling issue in Florida, the problem was never 
ultimately resolved. Following this almost groundbreaking case, the court 
in Dineen interpreted Florida law to not permit class action tolling, and 
left the plaintiffs without any means of relief. This Note then looks to 
other jurisdictions that have solved the tolling issue with savings statutes 
and explains why this is the best method for addressing the tolling issue 
in Florida. After considering this issue in light of the unique policy 
concerns underlying class actions and statutes of limitations, this Note 
argues that the Florida Legislature must adopt a savings statute to toll the 
limitations period for class actions that are denied relief because of 
jurisdictional issues.
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INTRODUCTION
With the passage of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA),1
federal jurisdiction for class actions greatly expanded. However, even 
before CAFA, class actions frequently made their way to federal court, 
through either diversity or federal question jurisdiction. In response to the 
expansive federal jurisdiction created by CAFA, some states, like Florida, 
took action and created legislation to narrow the scope of claims 
permitted as class actions in Florida state courts.2 Plaintiffs were 
therefore paradoxically found filing their class actions initially in federal 
court by satisfying the requirements of § 1332(d)(3) or (4),3 or by simply 
filing initially in state court, then being removed to federal court due to 
                                                                                                                     
1. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
2. 2006 Fla. Laws 1419 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. § 768.734 (2016)).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (d)(3)–(4) (2012).
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the CAFA revised removal statute,4 and dismissed or remanded back to 
state court.5
Whether we are examining a class of plaintiffs in either category, the 
issue discussed in this Note becomes pressing—what happens to the 
rights of class members when their class action is either dismissed 
completely or remanded to state court, and the statute of limitations has 
run by the time the plaintiffs attempt to re-file? Because these class 
members deserve to have their substantive claims heard and their rights 
adjudicated, it seems logical that courts would toll the limitations period 
during this time. While federal courts have adopted this interpretation of 
tolling in American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah6 and its progeny,7
this is not the established law in some jurisdictions, including Florida. 
Not only did Florida courts reject American Pipe,8 but they have also 
rejected equitable tolling,9 thus essentially denying relief for a class in 
this situation. The Florida Legislature has also chosen not to enact a 
savings statute. 
This Note proposes a solution to this problem in the form of suggested 
Florida legislation, which mirrors the legislation of other states that have 
adopted savings statutes for class actions like those discussed herein. Part 
I discusses the important policy considerations underlying the class 
action lawsuit. It then provides a comprehensive overview of CAFA and 
discusses the consequences that this statute has had on expanding federal 
jurisdiction for class actions. Part I then discusses Florida’s own statute 
governing class action jurisdiction in federal courts, and analyzes its 
effect, in conjunction with CAFA, on class action jurisdiction. 
Part II presents a hypothetical situation to begin the analysis of what 
happens to the limitations period upon a determination of improper 
jurisdiction. Part II then engages in a brief analysis of American Pipe and 
its progeny, to identify the existence of federal class action tolling. Within 
Part II, this Note then delves into a discussion of Florida law concerning 
tolling. In doing so, this section begins with an analysis of the Florida 
tolling statute.10 This Note then examines Florida case law interpreting 
and rejecting American Pipe. Equitable tolling is identified as a potential 
                                                                                                                     
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1453. 
5. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Roether, Note, Interpreting Congressional Silence: CAFA’s 
Jurisdictional Burden of Proof in Post-Removal Remand Proceedings, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2745, 
2783 (citing Evans v. Walter Indus., Inc., 449 F.3d 1159, 1165 (11th Cir. 2006)). 
6. 414 U.S. 538 (1974).
7. See, e.g., Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345 (1983).
8. See Becnel v. Deutsche Bank, AG, 507 Fed. App’x 71, 73 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing FLA.
STAT. § 95.051(2) (2012)) (determining that “Florida does not allow tolling during the pendency 
of class action lawsuits no matter where they are filed”).
9. See, e.g., HCA Health Servs. of Fla., Inc. v. Hillman, 906 So. 2d 1094, 1098–99 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
10. FLA. STAT. § 95.051.
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solution to the statute of limitations issue, and its rejection in Florida is 
discussed. Part II concludes with an analysis of Sacred Heart, a Florida 
case that almost altered Florida’s long history of rejecting limitations 
tolling, except in the specific instances specified in the Florida tolling 
statute.
Part III engages in an analysis of several different jurisdictions that 
have enacted savings statutes to allow for tolling of the statutes of 
limitations. Finally, Part IV urges the Florida Legislature to adopt a 
savings statute, similar to the one proposed by this Note, to remedy the 
problem of class action tolling in Florida. With the increased likelihood 
that class action plaintiffs will be left without remedy after their lawsuit 
is denied jurisdiction, Florida’s adoption of a savings statute would 
ensure that the effects of CAFA and the Florida class action statute do not 
strip class plaintiffs of their viable claims merely on procedural grounds.
I. THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 AND EXPANDED 
FEDERAL JURISDICTION 
As a vehicle to vindicate the rights of many at once, the class action 
lawsuit has proven itself to be an extremely useful tool in the American 
justice system. However, such positive results have not come without 
complications, including the sometimes illusory nature of true 
adjudication of class members’ rights. This portion of the Note will begin 
by briefly addressing the role of the class action lawsuit, the effects that 
CAFA has had on its use and function within federal courts, and Florida’s 
legislation furthering CAFA’s goals.
A. The Class Action and Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction
With the protection of public rights in mind, class actions were formed 
to “enable those with small claims for whom individual litigation would 
be economically irrational to band together in group litigation against a 
common adversary.”11 Proponents of class action lawsuits argue that they 
allow consolidation of claims, which decreases the plaintiffs’ time in 
court and expense.12 Therefore, in instances where an individual plaintiff 
alone could not justify the expense of bringing a lawsuit, the class action 
gives this individual the opportunity to seek justice.13 However, this 
positive notion of the class action also reveals one of its flaws, in that the 
increased ability of plaintiffs to bring their lawsuits through the class 
                                                                                                                     
11. Nan S. Ellis, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005: The Story Behind the Statute, 35 
J. LEGIS. 76, 76 (2009) (quoting Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in 
Historical Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1487 (2008)).
12. Id.
13. See id.
4
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action has contributed to the greatly increased number of lawsuits filed.14
While opponents criticize the increased filing for various reasons,15 it is 
important to note that for the purposes of this Note, this initial influx in 
filing represents the beginning of the issue, which was only complicated 
by CAFA. 
After February 18, 2005, when CAFA was signed into law,16 even 
greater opportunities were created to increase class action filing. In fact, 
following Congress’s expansion of federal jurisdiction for class actions 
meeting minimal diversity and over five million dollars in controversy, 
CAFA has been labeled as a “Class Action Federalization Act.”17
Accordingly, the Legislature insists that CAFA was intended to 
accomplish three goals: (1) to expand federal diversity jurisdiction for 
class actions; (2) to facilitate the removal of class actions from state to 
federal court; and (3) to alter federal procedures for settling class 
actions.18 Because of the need to keep state court judges from certifying 
truly nationwide class actions where they believe a federal judge would
not,19 as well as the increased objectivity desired for class certification 
issues, which many believe better comes from federal judges with more 
institutional experience in handling such lawsuits,20 CAFA emerged as 
federal legislation to solve these issues.
                                                                                                                     
14. See id. (describing this increase in filing as a “skyrocketing number”).
15. While this Note is not intended to explore the vast policy implications and concerns of 
the class action lawsuit, it should be further noted that the small amount that each plaintiff 
individually often has at stake in the lawsuit gives rise to concerns about disproportional lawyer 
gain. Id. (citing John H. Beisner et al., Class Action “Cops”: Public Servants or Private 
Entrepreneurs?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1441, 1442 (2005) (describing this gain as a “money generator” 
for lawyers)).
16. Linda Pissott Reig et al., The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005: Overview, Historical 
Perspective, and Settlement Requirements, 40 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 1087, 1087 (2005).
17. Alexandra D. Lahav, The Law and Large Numbers: Preserving Adjudication in 
Complex Litigation, 59 FLA. L. REV. 383, 416 (2007). When considered in light of other recent 
federal legislation, such as the Multiparty Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002, tort reform 
is likely also a driving factor in increasing federal jurisdiction for class action lawsuits, “based on 
the assumption that federal courts will be less sympathetic to mass tort and innovative tort claims 
than the state courts.” Id. However, for the purposes of this Note, it is important to simply 
appreciate the vast increase in federal jurisdiction for these claims, which certainly plays a role in 
backing up the federal court system.
18. Reig, supra note 16, at 1087; see also Mallory A Gitt, Comment, Removal Jurisdiction 
over Mass Actions, 90 WASH. L. REV. 453, 468 (2015) (listing Congress’s three primary goals to 
give federal courts control over more aggregate litigation as “[1] to assure fair and prompt 
recoveries for class members with legitimate claims; [2] to restore the intent of the Framers by 
expanding federal jurisdiction over inter-state class actions; and [3] to benefit society by 
encouraging innovation and lowering consumer prices” (quoting S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 30 
(2005))).
19. See Reig et al., supra note 16, at 1088.
20. See id.
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B.  Overview of CAFA and Its Limitations
CAFA contains nine sections, two of which constitute the table of 
contents and legislative intent, and four of which constitute enactment 
and housekeeping matters.21 Sections three, four, and five are the 
substantive provisions of the Act, which accomplish the three goals 
discussed above.22 Plaintiffs involved in a class action are now able to 
bypass the previous requirements of complete diversity and $75,000 per 
individual claim23 and instead satisfy the diversity requirement to obtain 
original jurisdiction in the federal court with an aggregate amount in 
controversy of five million dollars or more,24 so long as any member of 
the class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a state or foreign country different 
from that of any defendant.25
Amidst such a seemingly hospitable environment created by CAFA 
for classes to file in federal court, the federal Diversity of Citizenship 
statute still provides the court with many ways to decline jurisdiction and 
either dismiss the claim or remand it back to state court. Sections 
1332(d)(3)26 and (4)27 are responsible for these jurisdictional limitations. 
Subsection (d)(3) provides that, “in the interests of justice and looking at 
the totality of the circumstances,” a district court can decline to exercise 
jurisdiction established by § 1332(d)(2) over a class action “in which 
greater than one-third but less than two-thirds of the members of all 
proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate and the primary defendants are 
citizens of the State in which the action was originally filed based on 
consideration of”28 subsections (A)–(F).29
                                                                                                                     
21. Id.
22. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2012) (expanding diversity jurisdiction); see also id. § 1453 
(allowing class actions to more easily reach federal court by eliminating obstacles); id. §§ 1711–
15 (adding further procedures to ensure fairness in class action settlements).
23. See Reig et al., supra note 16, at 1089.
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).
25. Id. § 1332(d)(2)(A)–(C).
26. Id. § 1332(d)(3).
27. Id. § 1332(d)(4).
28. Id. § 1332(d)(3).
29. Id. § 1332(d)(3)(A)–(F) (“(A) whether the claims asserted involve matters of national 
or interstate interest; (B) whether the claims asserted will be governed by laws of the State in 
which the action was originally filed or by the law of other States; (C) whether the class action 
has been pleaded in a manner that seeks to avoid Federal jurisdiction; (D) whether the action was 
brought in a forum with a distinct nexus with the class members, the alleged harm, or the 
defendants; (E) whether the number of citizens of the State in which the action was originally 
filed in all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate is substantially larger than the number of 
citizens from any other State, and the citizenship of the other members of the proposed class is 
dispersed among a substantial number of States; and (F) whether, during the 3-year period 
preceding the filing of that class action, 1 or more other class actions asserting the same or similar 
claims on behalf of the same or other persons have been filed.”).
6
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Subsection (d)(4) also allows federal courts to decline to exercise 
jurisdiction established by paragraph 2 over a class action in which three 
elements are satisfied, in addition to the provisions following these 
elements: (1) “greater than two-thirds of the members of all proposed 
plaintiff classes in the aggregate are citizens of the State in which the 
action was originally filed”;30 (2) at least one defendant is one from whom 
the class members seek significant relief,31 “whose alleged conduct forms 
a significant basis for the claims asserted by the proposed plaintiff 
class”32 and “who is a citizen of the State in which the action was 
originally filed”;33 and (3) that the principal injuries from the alleged 
conduct must have occurred in the state in which the action was filed,34
and that “no other class action has been filed asserting the same or similar 
factual allegations against any of the defendants” on behalf of the same 
or similar class during the three year period before the action in question 
was filed.35 The final provision limiting federal diversity jurisdiction 
provides that jurisdiction will be declined if two-thirds or more of the 
plaintiff class members and the primary defendants “are citizens of the 
State in which the action was originally filed.”36 Therefore, under these 
provisions, if a class desires to ensure that its lawsuit will remain in state 
court, it must limit its class definition to the forum state and sue forum-
state defendants.37
CAFA also increases federal class action traffic by making the 
removal of lawsuits to federal court easier than it was before the Act. The 
federal removal of class actions statute38 eliminates the previous ban on 
diversity removal for class actions if any defendant is a forum-state 
citizen, does not require all defendants to join the notice of removal, and 
eliminates the one-year removal requirement.39 Because removal is the 
means by which many defendants will take the class action to federal 
court, it follows from the policy concerns of CAFA that this statute be 
liberal.
                                                                                                                     
30. Id. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(I).
31. Id. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(II)(aa).
32. Id. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(II)(bb).
33. Id. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(II)(cc).
34. Id. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(III).
35. Id. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)–(ii).
36. Id. § 1332(d)(4)(B).
37. See Reig et al., supra note 16, at 1089.
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b).
39. Id.; see Reig et al., supra note 16, at 1090. Subsection (c)(1) of the statute also allows 
for appellate review of a district court’s order on a motion to remand the class action to the state 
court from which it was removed, as long as the application is made to the appellate court within 
ten days after the order was entered. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1). 
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C.  Florida’s Furtherance of CAFA Policy Goals
Soon after CAFA was enacted, Florida followed its lead40 and enacted 
the Capacity to Sue statute,41 which would narrow the scope of 
permissible class action claims filed in Florida state courts.42 Before this 
statute was enacted, class membership for class action lawsuits filed in 
Florida state courts was not limited to Florida residents.43 Now, class 
membership for lawsuits filed in a state court is exclusively limited to 
Florida residents.44 Although this new requirement contains several 
narrow exceptions,45 the new law greatly reduces the ability of class 
plaintiffs to bring their claims in Florida state court. The statute also 
imposes another restriction46 on Florida claimants who wish to maintain 
a class action seeking statutory penalties with respect to motor vehicle 
licenses,47 consumer protection,48 retail installment sales,49 and motor 
vehicle lease disclosure50: If claimants wishing to keep their class action 
in Florida are unable to show actual loss of a compensatory value 
resulting from the alleged statutory violation, the claim will be unable to 
survive in Florida.51
                                                                                                                     
40. See Adam Feit, Tort Reform, One State at a Time: Recent Developments in Class 
Actions and Complex Litigation in New York, Illinois, Texas, and Florida, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
899, 958 (2008) (stating that the new Florida law “certainly complements CAFA and the national 
trend toward removing cases of national importance to federal courts”).
41. 2006 Fla. Laws 1419 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. § 768.734 (2016)).
42. Francis X. Rapprich III & Christopher M. Harne, Cutting Classes: Florida Tightens Its 
Restrictions on Class Action Lawsuits, FLA. B.J., Mar. 2007, at 9, 9 (describing the Act as 
potentially the most dramatic foray of the state legislature into the regulation of class action
lawsuits).
43. See id. However, even before 2006, Florida courts sometimes imposed their own 
restrictions on class membership. Id.; see, e.g., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672 So. 2d 
39, 42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (modifying the trial court’s decision to certify a nationwide class 
of over one million members to limit the class to only Florida residents, as class certification here 
would have overwhelmed the state court resources and been completely unmanageable).
44. FLA. STAT. § 768.734(1)(a).
45. Id. § 768.734(1)(b)(1) (stating that a Florida court can implement this exception for a 
plaintiff whose claim is recognized within the claimant’s state of residence and not time-barred, 
and “whose rights cannot be asserted because the claimant’s state of residence lacks personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant or defendants”). The statute also provides an additional exception 
that “the claimant class may include nonresidents if the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred 
in or emanated from this state.” Id. § 768.734(1)(b)(2).
46. Id. § 768.734(2). However, the statute does not include a requirement for nonmonetary 
claimants to prove actual damages. See Rapprich & Harne, supra note 42, at 9.
47. FLA. STAT. §§ 320.01–.95 (2016).
48. FLA. STAT. §§ 501.001–.997 (2016).
49. FLA. STAT. §§ 520.01–.999 (2016).
50. FLA. STAT. §§ 521.001–.006 (2016).
51. See Rapprich & Harne, supra note 42, at 9.
8
Florida Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol69/iss3/7
2017] FLORIDA CLASS ACTION JURISDICTION 997
As predicted,52 the Florida statute has had a great impact on sending 
class action lawsuits to federal court, especially when considered with 
CAFA.53 While these “castaway plaintiffs”54 could attempt to bring their 
lawsuit in their home state, assuming they could obtain personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant,55 it remains likely that CAFA’s lenient 
diversity and removal statutes would easily permit the class action to be 
either successfully filed in federal court first, assuming the plaintiffs’ 
attorney is aware of the strict Florida legislation, or simply be removed 
to federal court after originally being filed in a Florida state court. It is 
therefore imperative for the class members’ attorney to make a strategic 
decision about where to originally file the class action, because, as this 
Note will further discuss, an incorrect decision could be fatal for the 
lawsuit. 
II. CONSEQUENCES OF FILING IN THE WRONG FORUM
To begin, it is beneficial to further develop the issue with a 
hypothetical situation. Assume a class of 100 plaintiffs, most of whom 
are Florida residents, obtain a lawyer to represent the class in a lawsuit 
against Defendant X, who is a corporation with a national presence. 
While Defendant X is not incorporated in Florida, it maintains several 
substantial places of business within Florida. However, as with many 
Florida dwellers, it is not entirely clear whether each class member is 
actually domiciled in Florida permanently (many of the class members 
maintain vacation homes in Florida, yet some are not residents of 
Florida). While the residency complications presented here might 
resemble a convoluted law school civil procedure exam, it is important to 
appreciate the complex decisions Florida lawyers face when selecting a 
forum. If the lawyer believes that the amount in controversy exceeds five 
million dollars in the aggregate and the corporation can be considered a 
resident of the state in which it is incorporated (not Florida), diversity 
jurisdiction could be established under CAFA, because there are at least 
100 class members.56 However, if the claim brought by plaintiffs includes 
a nonfederal question, the lawyer may have doubts about successfully 
obtaining diversity jurisdiction under § 1332.
                                                                                                                     
52. See, e.g., Feit, supra note 40, at 958 (predicting that the new law would “certainly
reduce the number of complex class actions involving large numbers of nonresidents”); Rapprich 
& Harne, supra note 42, at 9 (stating that the law “could drastically reduce the size and number 
of class action claims brought in Florida state courts”).
53. Feit, supra note 40, at 958 (stating that the new Florida law “certainly complements 
CAFA and the national trend toward removing cases of national importance to federal courts”).
54. Rapprich & Harne, supra note 42, at 12.
55. See id. at 9.
56 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A) (2016).
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Additionally, even if the lawyer believes he can successfully satisfy 
the three requirements of CAFA, he still must consider the limitations 
established in paragraphs 3 and 4 of § 1332(d).57 Although CAFA’s 
expansion of diversity jurisdiction has increased the likelihood that this 
lawsuit can successfully satisfy the diversity requirement for federal 
jurisdiction, the district court still retains many possible avenues through 
which it can either dismiss the lawsuit or remand it back to a Florida state 
court. 
Perhaps, after considering these possibilities, the lawyer determines 
that it is more likely that a Florida state court is the proper forum in which 
to file the class action. In this case, he must be wary of Florida’s 
limitations on the ability of a plaintiff to file a class action in a Florida 
state court.58 If the lawyer determines that Florida Statutes § 768.734 will 
not inhibit his ability to file, and the issue concerns a nonfederal question, 
perhaps the Florida court will have proper jurisdiction. However, if this 
occurs, it is usually likely that Defendant X will work to remove the 
lawsuit to federal court. Fortunately for the defendant, CAFA has made 
this easier, as previously discussed.59 Therefore, the class could very well 
find its way to federal court anyway, despite the lawyer’s initial 
deliberations. The possibility always remains that the class action will be 
remanded back to state court by the district court.
Clearly, such jurisdictional complications present issues with timing, 
and thus give rise to Defendant X’s statutes of limitations defenses. After 
the class action makes it to federal court (which it likely will, regardless 
of whether the plaintiffs’ attorney originally files it there first), it will 
have to wait to be heard on a motion to determine jurisdiction. Such 
waiting period will likely take some time, because of the increased access 
all class and mass action lawsuits have to federal courts through CAFA. 
Therefore, upon its initial filing, the statute of limitations period begins 
to run on the plaintiffs’ claim. What will happen if, upon either the Florida 
court or the district court’s determination of improper jurisdiction, the 
lawsuit is dismissed or remanded, yet the limitations period has run? Will 
the lawyer have to explain the dismissal to the class as a loss? Or will he 
have the opportunity to re-file the lawsuit in the proper forum, even 
though the statute of limitations has run? Unfortunately, for these Florida 
plaintiffs, the lawsuit will be dead.
                                                                                                                     
57. See supra notes 26–36 and accompanying text.
58. See supra text accompanying notes 40–51.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 36–37.
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A.  American Pipe and Its Progeny: The Establishment of 
Federal Tolling
For the hypothetical class of plaintiffs discussed above, federal courts 
would permit the limitations period to be suspended and thus allow 
adjudication of their rights. Before the state and federal cases concerning 
tolling are considered, it should be noted that for the purpose of this Note, 
a nuanced analysis of American Pipe and its progeny is not entirely 
necessary, as these cases are explored extensively in thousands of other 
publications.60 But to begin a brief survey of these cases, the well-known 
case that began a trilogy of federal tolling cases is American Pipe & 
Construction Co. v. Utah.61 In American Pipe, the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that the filing of a class action under Federal Rule 23 would toll the 
statute of limitations during the pendency of the action.62 The Court 
further held that the same tolling standard should be applied where 
unnamed class members, who were unaware of the proceedings brought 
initially in their interest, seek to intervene in the action later on.63
Only nine years later, the Supreme Court held in Crown, Cork & Seal 
Co. v. Parker64 that upon denial of class certification, the statute of 
limitations is tolled when absent members seek to initiate their own, 
independent lawsuits, rather than intervening in the putative class 
action,65 thereby expanding the instances in which tolling is applied. 
Following this decision, the Supreme Court reigned in its willingness to 
toll with Chardon v. Fumero Soto,66 in holding that American Pipe did 
not actually establish a uniform federal rule of decision mandating 
suspension, rather than renewal, whenever a federal class action tolls a 
statute of limitations.67 These three cases establish the acceptance of class 
                                                                                                                     
60. More useful to this Note will be the subsequent analysis of class actions interpreting 
Florida state law and the American Pipe holding. See Rhonda Wasserman, Tolling: The American 
Pipe Tolling Rule and Successive Class Actions, 58 FLA. L. REV. 803, 805 (2006); see also
Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650 (1983); Mitchell A. Lowenthal & Norman Menachem 
Feder, The Impropriety of Class Action Tolling for Mass Tort Statutes of Limitations, 64 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 532, 533 (1996) (arguing that in the area of mass tort class actions, state courts 
have been improperly influenced by federal determinations on tolling the statute of limitations); 
Kathleen L. Cerveny, Note, Limitation Tolling When Class Status Denied: Chardon v. Fumero 
Soto and Alice in Wonderland, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 686, 701 (1985).
61. 441 U.S. 538 (1974); see Wasserman, supra note 60, at 805 (stating that in American 
Pipe, “the Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations is suspended for the period between 
the filing of a class action complaint and the denial of a motion to certify the class when, upon 
denial of class certification for a lack of numerosity, absent class members seek to intervene in 
the action to press their individual claims”).
62. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co., 441 U.S. at 550–51.
63. Id. at 551–52.
64. 462 U.S. 345 (1983).
65. Id. at 353–54; see Wasserman, supra note 60, at 806. 
66. 462 U.S. 650 (1983).
67. Id. at 662.
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action tolling within the federal realm. What follows is an analysis of how 
this law has been applied by courts interpreting Florida law, the central 
issue of this Note. 
B.  Tolling in Florida
While the previously discussed trilogy of case law has helped to clear 
the issue of when to toll the limitations period for class action lawsuits, it 
must again be emphasized that these cases involved class actions that 
were filed in federal court, asserted federal causes of action, and involved 
federal statutes of limitations. It follows that American Pipe is only 
persuasive for state courts. Therefore, before entertaining a discussion of 
Florida courts’ failure to follow the precedent set forth in American Pipe,
the Florida tolling statute must be considered.
1.  The Florida Tolling Statute and Its Interpretation
The Florida statute defining when statutes of limitations are to be 
tolled covers any statute of limitations, as delineated by the statute, with 
some exceptions.68 The statute provides for tolling in situations where the 
individual being sued is absent from the state,69 has used a false name and 
thus avoided service of process,70 or has concealed himself so as to avoid 
service of process.71 It should be noted that paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) 
will not apply if service of process or publication can be made to confer 
jurisdiction in a sufficient manner.72 Additional situations relating to 
minors, incapacitated individuals, and monetary or arbitral proceedings 
provide specific reasons for tolling the limitations period under the 
statute.73
                                                                                                                     
68. FLA. STAT. § 95.051 (2016). The statute delineates exceptions for claims arising out of 
§ 95.281 (real property), § 95.35 (termination of contracts to purchase real estate in which there 
is no maturity date), and § 95.36 (dedications to municipalities or counties for park purposes). 
69. Id. § 95.051(1)(a).
70. Id. § 95.051(1)(b).
71. Id. § 95.051(1)(c).
72. Id. § 95.051. Additionally, paragraph 2 of the statute does not allow for a disability or 
any other reason to constitute a reason to toll, except as specified in the Florida Probate Code or 
Guardianship Law. Id. § 95.051(2).
73. The statute permits tolling if the person entitled to sue is adjudicated incapacitated 
before the cause of action accrued, as long as the action was begun within seven years of the “act, 
event, or occurrence giving rise to the cause of action.” Id. § 95.051(1)(d). Likewise, the period 
is tolled in paternity actions during the time of voluntary payments made by an alleged father, and 
during any time in which a parent, guardian, or ad litem either does not exist, has an adverse 
interest to the person entitled to sue, or is himself incapacitated to sue, or for a minor or previously 
adjudicated incapacitated person entitled to sue. Id. § 95.051(1)(e), (i). This section also creates 
an exception for the statute of limitations for a medical malpractice claim as provided for in 
section 95.11. Id. § 95.051(1)(i). Also, like paragraph (d), the lawsuit must also have begun 
“within 7 years after the act, event, or occurrence giving rise to the cause of action.” Id. The tolling 
12
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Clearly, there is no provision in this statute providing for tolling of the 
limitations period for class actions. To compound this issue, Florida 
courts have been notoriously strict in their interpretation of the statute. 
Time and time again, both Florida courts and federal courts interpreting 
state law74 have expressly stated that unless the reason for tolling is 
delineated in the tolling statute, tolling will not be available for the 
lawsuit.75 Additionally, the clear language of the statute in paragraph 2 
indicates that tolling is not available for any “disability or other reason,” 
except those reasons enumerated in paragraph 1.76 It follows that because 
courts are so strict in their interpretation of the Florida tolling statute, 
class members in need of its relief must simply watch their potentially 
meritorious lawsuit die if the limitations period expires before they are 
able to re-file in the proper forum.
2.  Florida and American Pipe
Because class members will be unable to use the Florida tolling statute 
to preserve the limitations period, it is important to discuss the role that 
American Pipe tolling has played in courts interpreting Florida law, 
because if Florida is a jurisdiction in which such common law tolling has 
been adopted, this is another means by which class plaintiffs could toll 
                                                                                                                     
statute delineates two provisions for tolling that deal with monetary proceedings, including 
allowing tolling when “[t]he payment of any part of the principal or interest of any obligation or 
liability founded on a written instrument.” Id. § 95.051(1)(f). Tolling is permitted during the 
period of an intervening bankruptcy for the expiration period of a tax certificate. Id. 
§ 95.051(1)(h). This portion of the statute also provides for tolling in any proceeding under 
chapter 197. Id. § 95.051(1)(i). Finally, the pendency of an arbitral proceeding “pertaining to a 
dispute that is the subject to the action” also tolls the limitations period. Id. § 95.051(1)(g).
74. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 743 (1980) (stating that state law on 
tolling the statute of limitations will be applied to an action based on state law, but in federal 
court). 
75. See, e.g., Foxworth v. Kia Motors Corp., 377 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1203 n.9 (N.D. Fla. 
2005) (“Florida law does not allow the tolling of statutes of limitation for any reasons other than 
those specifically enumerated in Fla. Stat. § 95.051.”); Senger Bros. Nursery v. E.I. Dupont de 
Nemours & Co., 184 F.R.D. 674, 685 (M.D. Fla. 1999) (“Florida Statute § 95.051 does not permit 
tolling of statutes of limitation for any reason, other than those specifically included in the 
statute.”); In re Se. Banking Corp., 855 F. Supp. 353, 357 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (“Only those 
circumstances expressly provided by the statute will toll the statute of limitations.”); Major 
League Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So. 2d 1071, 1075 (Fla. 2001) (“Section 95.051 delineates an 
exclusive list of conditions that can ‘toll’ the running of the statute of limitations . . . .”); Hearndon 
v. Graham, 767 So. 2d 1179, 1184 (Fla. 2000) (deferring to legislative intent that no tolling 
exceptions exist to § 95.051); HCA Health Servs. of Fla., Inc. v. Hillman, 906 So. 2d 1094, 1098
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (“[T]he legislature has made clear its intent to exclude all tolling 
exceptions not listed in the statute . . . [and] unlike the majority of states, Florida has chosen not 
to adopt a ‘savings statute’ that allows a plaintiff whose case has been dismissed otherwise than 
on the merits to pursue the action even though the statute of limitations has run.”).
76. FLA. STAT. § 95.051(2).
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the statute of limitations. Few Florida courts have discussed American 
Pipe, and none have adopted it as the law.77 As the following cases 
illustrate, any analysis of Florida law has unmistakably been interpreted 
as not allowing for American Pipe tolling.
In 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit faced this 
issue while interpreting Florida law in Becnel v. Deutsche Bank.78 Here, 
Plaintiffs brought a diversity suit against defendants, alleging fraud, 
breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and other claims related to 
Plaintiff’s purchase of a tax shelter.79 In his complaint, the Plaintiff pled 
that he was a resident of Florida.80 Therefore, the court applied the Florida 
statute of limitations for fraud and fiduciary duty claims,81 which is four 
years, and the Florida statute of limitations for contract claims,82 which 
is five years.83 The court reasoned that the statute of limitations period 
for the fraud-based claims should have been discoverable through due 
diligence, and therefore began when the facts giving rise to the claims 
were discoverable.84 Further, for both of the claims at issue, the time for 
filing suit started to run from the date of accrual of the claim.85
The court determined that, because the Plaintiff’s accounts with 
Defendant were closed on or about May 15, 2015, and the lawsuit was 
filed on March 9, 2011, Plaintiff’s contract and fiduciary claims were 
time-barred.86 The court also found Plaintiff’s fraud-based claims to be 
time-barred.87 Because a discovery rule governed, the Plaintiff’s claim 
would only have been timely if he did not have constructive notice, before 
March 9, 2007, of the facts giving rise to this claim.88 As the lead Plaintiff 
in a class action lawsuit alleging claims based in fraud against the 
defendant, amongst others, filed on January 28, 2005, the Plaintiff had 
actual notice of the facts that gave rise to the lawsuit.89 Therefore, the 
                                                                                                                     
77. See Answer Brief of Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC at 19 n.11, Anderson v. Mosaic Fertilizer, 
LLC, 160 So. 3d 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (No. 2D13-5828), 2014 WL 1399210 (citing 
Hromyak v. Tyco Int’l, Ltd., 942 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (explaining that the 
Hromyak “court applied American Pipe tolling to a federal statute of limitations, and thus has 
‘little persuasive value’ on the issue of Florida law”)) (stating that only five Florida court decisions 
have discussed American Pipe).
78. 507 Fed. App’x 71 (2d Cir. 2013).
79. Id. at 72.
80. Id.
81. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(j) (2016). 
82. Id. § 95.11(2)(b). 
83. Becnel, 507 Fed. App’x at 72–73.
84. Id. at 73.
85. Id.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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court found each element of the lawsuit to be time barred, as the statutes 
of limitations had run.90 In its reasoning, the court explicitly stated that 
“Florida does not allow tolling during the pendency of class action 
lawsuits no matter where they are filed.”91 The court made it clear that 
American Pipe tolling should not be applied in Florida law and that after 
a federal court denies a class action lawsuit leave to proceed within that 
forum, tolling will not be recognized for individual claims brought in 
state court after such remand or dismissal.92
Additionally, the plaintiff requested the Second Circuit to certify to 
the Florida Supreme Court the question of whether Florida would 
recognize cross-jurisdictional tolling.93 The court declined to do so, 
again, because of the clarity found in the Florida tolling statute,94 and 
because it determined that “any request to the Florida courts to accept 
certification would almost certainly be rejected.”95 The Second Circuit 
made this determination because even if the statute of limitations began 
to run on May 2000, the lawsuit would still be barred if Florida applied 
cross-jurisdictional tolling.96 Therefore, because Florida’s application of 
cross-jurisdictional tolling was not determinative in Becnel, the Florida 
Supreme Court never resolved this issue.
Another case illustrating the role, or lack thereof, of the American 
Pipe rule in Florida class actions is In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation.97
This lawsuit began when Southeast Milk, Inc., an indirect purchaser of 
vitamin products, filed a price fixing lawsuit in a Florida state court 
against several vitamin manufacturers.98 Defendants subsequently 
removed the lawsuit from Florida state court to federal court based on 
diversity.99 After removal, the case was transferred to the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia.100 Defendants then filed a motion to 
dismiss, alleging that the four-year statute of limitations barred the 
plaintiff’s claim, which the district court granted.101 The court reasoned 
that this ruling was appropriate, because the lawsuit filed on December 
                                                                                                                     
90. See id. at 72–73 (stating appellant’s suit was time barred under either Florida or New 
York’s statute of limitations).
91. Id. at 73 (citing FLA. STAT. § 95.051(2) (2016)).
92. 1 JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3:15 (13th ed. 2016) 
(interpreting Becnel v. Deutsche Bank, AG, 507 Fed. Appx. 71 (2d Cir. 2013)).
93. See Becnel, 507 Fed. App’x at 73 n.2.
94. See id.
95. Id.
96. See id.
97. In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 183 Fed. App’x 1 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
98. Id. at 1.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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1, 2003 did not include allegations of any relevant facts occurring after 
March 1999.102 Because Florida law mandates that the statute of 
limitations begins to run when a cause of action accrues, meaning “when 
the last element constituting the cause of action occurs,”103 the motion to 
dismiss was granted.104
On appeal, the plaintiff alleged that the limitations period was tolled 
during the pendency of a related class action, of which the plaintiff had 
been a class member from June 1999 to 2001, because of the American 
Pipe rule.105 However, the court disagreed with the plaintiff’s argument 
and found that the statute of limitations was not tolled during this 
period.106 In its reasoning, the court looked to the Florida tolling statute 
to determine that the statute clearly allows for tolling in only eight 
enumerated scenarios.107 The court also looked to the case law mentioned 
earlier in this Note,108 and reasoned that the Florida Supreme Court has 
made it plainly clear that the list enumerated in the Florida tolling statute 
is exclusive.109 The court further found that the case law presented by the 
plaintiff did not support a contention “that Florida courts would 
contravene the straightforward statutory language,” especially 
considering the Florida Supreme Court’s earlier determination that courts 
generally will not write in exceptions to statutes of limitations where the 
legislature has not done so.110 Therefore, an application of the American 
Pipe rule to Florida law was denied, the statute of limitations was not 
tolled, and the plaintiff’s request for certification to the Florida Supreme 
Court was denied.111
The final case that demonstrates Florida’s reluctance to adopt the 
American Pipe tolling rule is In re Rezulin Products Liability 
Litigation.112 Here, the plaintiff sustained a Rezulin-induced liver injury 
in October 1999, yet did not commence the lawsuit until March 22, 
2004.113 Because this case was governed by Florida’s four-year statute of 
limitations, the defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the 
complaint on the ground that it was barred by the statute of limitations.114
                                                                                                                     
102. Id.
103. FLA. STAT. § 95.031(1) (2016).
104. Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 183 Fed. App’x at 1.
105. Id. at 2 (citing Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974)).
106. See id.
107. See id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 95.051(1)).
108. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
109. See Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 183 Fed. App’x at 2.
110. Id. (citing Fed. Ins. Co. v. Sw. Fla. Ret. Ctr., Inc., 707 So. 2d 1119, 1122 (Fla. 1998)).
111. Id.
112. No. 00Civ.2843LAK, 2006 WL 695253, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2006).
113. Id.
114. Id.
16
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However, the plaintiff maintained that her action was timely filed based 
on the tolling rule established in American Pipe, as she was a putative 
member of a class seeking recovery for Rezulin-induced injuries.115
While interpreting Florida law, the Southern District of New York 
rejected this argument.116
In its reasoning, the court plainly differentiated the toll that was 
adopted in American Pipe from the toll that would have to be adopted in 
this case, as American Pipe represented a toll of the federal statute of 
limitations for a federal claim, brought through a federal class action.117
The court made it clear that the instant case represented an entirely 
different situation, with the plaintiff requesting that the state statute of 
limitations be tolled for a purely state law claim.118 Therefore, the court 
succinctly rejected American Pipe, holding, “Florida law governs the 
question whether the statute was tolled by the filing of one or more other 
class actions. Florida does not permit class action tolling.”119
3.  Florida Law and Equitable Tolling
Because neither statutory tolling nor the American Pipe rule are 
available to class action plaintiffs under Florida law, class plaintiffs who 
find themselves in a situation like the one discussed above120 are forced 
to make an alternative argument as to why the court should toll the statute 
of limitations. This is when, as a last ditch effort of sorts, plaintiffs argue 
that equitable tolling should suspend the statute of limitations, as 
equitable arguments can be made in the absence of express savings or 
tolling statutes.121 In situations where equity so demands, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has tolled the statute of limitations, unless such an 
interpretation of tolling would be “inconsistent with the text of the 
relevant statute.”122 While the Supreme Court has stated that legislative 
intent must be considered when an equitable tolling issue is being 
decided,123 the presence of “fraud, concealment, or other misconduct on 
                                                                                                                     
115. Id. (citing Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974)).
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. Id. (citing Senger Bros. Nursery, Inc. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 184 F.R.D. 
674, 680 (M.D. Fla. 1999)) (rejecting the plaintiff’s similar reliance on American Pipe and Crown, 
Cork & Seal, and finding that under the Florida tolling statute, the claims were time-barred).
120. See supra Part II.
121. See Wasserman, supra note 60, at 815.
122. Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 49 (2002) (quoting United States v. Beggerly, 524 
U.S. 38, 48 (1998)).
123. See Wasserman, supra note 60, at 816 (describing the issue of equitable tolling as “one 
of ‘legislative intent whether the right shall be enforceable . . . after the prescribed time’” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Burnette v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 426 (1965))).
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the part of the defendant”124 have all served as reasons to toll the statute 
of limitations. However, even in the absence of these factors, some courts 
have room to toll the statutes of limitations as they deem equity would 
require, and consequently have done so.125
In Florida, precedent makes it clear that equitable tolling is not a 
viable means for class action plaintiffs to re-file their lawsuit in the proper 
forum after it has been dismissed from federal court for lack of 
jurisdiction, even after the statute of limitations has run.126 In HCA Health 
Services of Florida, Inc. v. Hillman,127 Florida’s Second District Court of 
Appeal held that the doctrine of equitable tolling could not be applied in 
civil actions.128 The defendants challenged the final judgment awarding 
damages to the plaintiffs, who were critical care nurses in one of the 
defendant’s hospitals.129 The nurses brought a whistleblower action 
pursuant to Florida Statutes § 448.103 against the defendant, their 
employer, because they were disciplined after complaining about 
deficient nursing care.130 Under § 448.103, aggrieved employees can 
institute a civil action within two years after discovering the retaliatory 
personnel action, or within four years after the personnel action was 
taken, whichever occurs earlier.131 In this case, each cause of action could 
have accrued no later than either May 27, 1999, or July 2, 1999.132 The 
plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on July 9, 2001, followed by the defendant’s 
filing of a motion to dismiss, or summary judgment in the alternative, 
based on the statute of limitations.133
In response to the defendant’s motion, the plaintiffs maintained that 
the doctrine of equitable tolling should be applied to sustain their claims, 
even though the complaint was clearly filed after the limitations period 
                                                                                                                     
124. Id. at 817 (discussing equitable tolling principles).
125. See id. Like legislatures that have enacted savings statutes to toll the limitations period 
during the same claim’s pendency of previous litigation, the Arizona Supreme Court has outlined 
the three circumstances in which it will equitably toll the statute of limitations, all of which must 
be met for tolling to apply. Id. at 817 (“The . . . requirements for the equitable tolling doctrine are 
as follows: 1) timely notice to the defendant in filing the first claim; 2) lack of prejudice to the 
defendant in gathering evidence to defend against the second claim; [and] 3) reasonable and good 
faith conduct by the plaintiff in prosecuting the first action and diligence in filing the second 
action.” (alteration in original) (quoting Hosogai v. Kadota, 700 P.2d 1327, 1333 (Ariz. 1985))).
126. 35 FLA. JUR. 2D Limitations and Laches § 91 (2016) (“Other courts, however, have 
declined to apply equitable tolling outside the administrative law context, and these courts include 
a Florida district court of appeals and federal district courts construing Florida law.”).
127. 906 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
128. Id. at 1099.
129. Id. at 1095.
130. Id.
131. FLA. STAT. § 448.103(1)(a) (2016).
132. See HCA Health Servs., 906 So. 2d at 1095.
133. Id.
18
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had run.134 The plaintiffs based their argument on Machules v. 
Department of Administration,135 and contended that they had been 
“lulled into inaction” by their original and timely assertion of their rights 
in the wrong forum.136 While the court recognized that generally, the 
doctrine of equitable tolling has been applied in situations where the 
plaintiff was “misled or lulled into inaction, has in some extraordinary 
way been prevented from asserting his rights, or has timely asserted his 
rights mistakenly in the wrong forum,” the court declined to extend this 
line of reasoning to the civil action at hand, as it distinguished Machules
from the instant case.137 In doing so, the court stated that in Machules, the 
Florida Supreme Court held that the doctrine of equitable tolling could be 
applied to extend a time limit for a pro se plaintiff to seek review under 
an administrative rule, because the plaintiff was misled and lulled into 
inaction by his employer.138 Therefore, the Florida’s Second District 
Court of Appeal interpreted the Machules decision as only laying the 
foundation for applying the equitable tolling doctrine in administrative 
law cases.139 Remaining loyal to legislative intent, the court further noted 
that this decision aligns with previous case law,140 where the Florida 
Supreme Court “declined to create additional tolling exceptions to those 
listed in the statute and instead deferred to the legislative directive that 
there be no tolling exceptions other than those declared by the 
legislature.”141 Because Machules did not address the application of 
equitable tolling to any of the provisions of chapter 95 of the Florida 
Statutes, and because the plaintiffs were unable to cite to any case law in 
which the Florida Supreme Court applied the equitable tolling doctrine 
outside of the administrative law context, the court held that equitable 
tolling was not available to the plaintiffs.142
For the purposes of this Note, it is important to recognize that the court 
also found it significant that, unlike the majority of states, Florida has not 
                                                                                                                     
134. Id.
135. 523 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 1988).
136. HCA Health Servs., 906 So. 2d at 1095.
137. Id. (quoting Machules, 523 So. 2d at 1134) (“The doctrine of equitable tolling was 
developed to permit under certain circumstances the filing of a lawsuit that otherwise would be 
barred by a limitations period . . . . [E]quitable tolling . . . ‘focuses on the plaintiff’s excusable 
ignorance of the limitations period and on [the] lack of prejudice to the defendant.’” (alteration in 
original) (quoting Machules, 523 So. 2d at 1133–34)).
138. Id. at 1098 (citing Machules, 523 So. 2d at 1135–37).
139. See id.
140. See id. at 1099 (citing Major League Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So. 2d 1071, 1075 (Fla. 
2001) (“Section 95.051 delineates an exclusive list of conditions that can ‘toll’ the running of the 
statute of limitations . . . .”); Hearndon v. Graham, 767 So. 2d 1179, 1184 (Fla. 2000) (deferring 
to legislative intent that no tolling exceptions exist to § 95.051).
141. Id. 
142. See id. at 1100.
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adopted a savings statute which would permit a plaintiff to pursue his or 
her action after the statute of limitations had run, as long as the lawsuit 
was dismissed otherwise than on the merits.143 Generally speaking, a 
savings statute would allow a plaintiff’s lawsuit to be reinstituted in the 
proper state court, notwithstanding the running of the limitations period, 
after it is dismissed from federal court for lack of jurisdiction.144 It is also 
significant to take notice of the plaintiffs’ subsequent argument, that the 
Florida Legislature’s failure to adopt a savings statute is immaterial to the 
instant application of equitable tolling, because the Florida Constitution 
gives the “judiciary, not the legislature, the power to establish rules for 
the transfer of cases from a court without jurisdiction to a court with 
jurisdiction.”145 While this is accurate, the court’s reliance on case law’s 
interpretation of the Florida tolling statute allowed it to decline to extend 
Machules’s ruling as a general rule of common law.146
Accordingly, in Pierson v. Orlando Regional Healthcare Systems, 
Inc.,147 the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida followed 
Machules and HCA Health Service’s lead and determined that equitable 
tolling was not available to plaintiffs outside of an administrative
action.148 In this lawsuit, the plaintiff filed untimely tort claims against 
the institution where he previously practiced medicine.149 Similar to the 
rationale in HCA Health, the district court reasoned that the Florida 
Statute expressly delineates instances where tolling is appropriate150 and 
that equitable tolling cannot be extended outside of the administrative 
context in Florida courts.151 Therefore, the doctrine of equitable tolling 
was held to be unavailable to the plaintiff, and his allegations were time-
barred.152
Another instance where a court, interpreting Florida law, found that 
the equitable tolling doctrine was unavailable as a method to suspend the 
statute of limitations occurred in Foxworth v. Kia Motors Corp.153 There, 
the court addressed the concept of equitable tolling, without it having 
                                                                                                                     
143. Id. at 1098.
144. Id. at 1099.
145. Id. (citing FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a)).
146. Id.
147. No. 6:08-cv-466-Orl-28GJK, 2010 WL 1408391 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 6, 2010).
148. See id. at *15 (finding that this court was “bound by the holding of the Second District 
Court of Appeal in HCA Health”).
149. See id. at *1, *15.
150. Id. at *15 (citing FLA. STAT § 95.051 (2016)) (finding, like the cases interpreting the 
statute itself, the express wording of the statute also expressly prohibits tolling based on 
subsection 2 of the statute).
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. 377 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (N.D. Fla. 2005).
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been alleged by the plaintiffs.154 After filing suit against Kia Motors after 
a car accident, the defendants received a judgment of dismissal on forum 
non conveniens grounds, which included the plaintiffs consent to a
waiver of statutes of limitations defenses.155 The court found that the 
defendants did nothing to coax the plaintiffs into any “disadvantageous 
legal position,” and therefore, contrary to the plaintiffs’ contention, the 
defendants could not be equitably estopped from asserting a statute of 
limitations defense.156 Interestingly, the court stated that, even though the 
plaintiffs did not argue for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations, 
the limitations period should not be statutorily or equitably tolled in this 
instance, because “Florida law does not allow the tolling of statutes of 
limitation for any reasons other than those specifically enumerated in Fla. 
Stat. § 95.051.”157 Therefore, case law makes it explicitly apparent that 
Florida courts are unwilling to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling to 
statutes of limitations.
4.  No Tolling for the Sacred Heart
While a denial of equitable tolling is the established rule in Florida, 
within the complex realm of class actions, the concept of equitable tolling
must be further discussed with respect to a case that could have altered 
Florida law—Sacred Heart Health System v. Humana Military 
Healthcare Services.158 There, the plaintiffs filed a diversity action 
individually and as a class, asserting breach of contract claims against the 
defendant.159 The plaintiffs also individually sued the defendant for fraud 
in the inducement.160 Because the class certification hearing was 
scheduled to occur soon after the hearing at issue, the court had to 
determine whether there was any basis, under Florida or federal law, to 
toll the plaintiffs’ limitations period for their individual claims.161 While 
still in the trial court, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
Florida held that the statute of limitations could be equitably tolled 
through an application of the American Pipe tolling rule.162 In making 
this determination, the trial court applied Florida law, and reasoned that, 
as HCA Health Services illustrated, Florida is unlike many other states, 
which have adopted a savings statute to allow plaintiffs to pursue their 
                                                                                                                     
154. See id. at 1203 n.9.
155. Id. at 1203.
156. Id. (quoting Major League Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So. 2d 1071, 1076 (Fla. 2001)).
157. Id. at n.9.
158. No. 3:07cv62/MCR, 2008 WL 2385506, at *1 (N.D. Fla. June 9, 2008).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See id.
162. See id. at *3.
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claims after they are dismissed, other than on the merits, after the 
limitations period has run.163 The court also agreed with HCA Health 
Services and Major League Baseball, and stated that Florida Statutes 
§ 95.051 outlines an exclusive list of the eight conditions that can toll the 
limitations period, and accordingly, none of the plaintiffs’ claims fell 
within these conditions.164 The court then determined that equitable 
tolling principles would apply to the individual claims.165
Remarkably, the court made a swift departure from the previously 
identified case law and looked to the overarching purpose of the class
action suit, which is to “save a multiplicity of suits, to reduce the expense 
of litigation, to make legal processes more effective and expeditious, and 
to make available a remedy that would otherwise not exist.”166 The court 
then applied case law from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit to reason that, where the state’s class action rule is “similar or 
virtually identically to” Federal Rule 23, American Pipe tolling has been 
adopted, because both state and federal courts possess similar interests in 
“deterring ‘protective’ filings of potentially redundant individual suits 
during the pendency of a class action . . . .”167 The court concluded that 
because Florida’s class action rule is modeled after Federal Rule 23,168
Florida has an interest similar to the federal interest in equitably tolling 
class actions, which promotes economy and efficiency of class action 
procedures.169
Upon finding a sufficient policy rationale for why the limitations 
period should be tolled, the court looked to Florida case law to bolster its 
reasoning. In doing so, the court first looked to Raie v. Cheminova, 
Inc.,170 which stated that “[t]here is no dispute that American Pipe has 
been followed in Florida state courts.”171 However, the court in Raie
provided no citation for this statement, and therefore supplied no 
examples of cases in which Florida courts followed the American Pipe
rule. The court then stated that at the time of its decision, only two Florida 
courts have cited American Pipe, which both offered little persuasive 
value for the instant case.172 While Hromyak offered no value to the 
                                                                                                                     
163. See id. at *1.
164. See id. 
165. See id.
166. Id. (quoting Tenney v. City of Miami Beach, 11 So. 2d 188, 189 (Fla. 1942)).
167. Id. (quoting Wade v. Danek Med., Inc., 182 F.3d 281, 286–87 (4th Cir. 1999)).
168. Compare FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.220, with FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
169. Sacred Heart Health Sys., 2008 WL 2385506, at *1.
170. Raie v. Cheminova, Inc., 336 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2003) (interpreting Florida law).
171. Id. at 1282.
172. See Hromyak v. Tyco Int’l Ltd., 942 So. 2d 1022, 1023 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) 
(possessing little persuasive value, as it applied American Pipe to a federal statute of limitations); 
Latman v. Costa Cruise Lines, N.V., 758 So. 2d 699, 704 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (finding that 
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instant case, the court determined that Latman was relevant in its 
illustration of how Florida class action plaintiffs are treated differently 
than non-class plaintiffs with respect to the limitations period.173 This 
allowed the court to reason that, as a general matter, both federal and 
Florida class actions function to benefit plaintiffs in some circumstances 
while operating to their detriment in others.174
Therefore, the court reasoned that American Pipe and its progeny best 
illustrate the difference in equitable treatment of class plaintiffs 
functioning under a federal statute of limitations.175 By linking these 
equitable principles to the reasoning underlying two Florida Supreme 
Court decisions, which did not specifically mention American Pipe, its 
progeny, or even the phrase “equitable tolling,” the court concluded that 
based on the treatment afforded to these plaintiffs, “the doctrine of 
common law equitable tolling as outlined in American Pipe appears to 
have been effectively applied in Florida, even though not identified by 
that specific rubric.”176 Such a “de facto” application of American Pipe
tolling was deemed sufficient by the trial court to hold that the plaintiffs 
were permitted to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling to their 
individual claims.177
Following this decision, the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification 
was granted under Federal Rule 23.178 Interlocutory review was then 
granted for review of the certification of this class of approximately 260 
hospitals, located in six states.179 The defendants challenged the district 
court’s determination that the common questions would predominate 
over the individual ones—which makes the class action the appropriate 
method of resolving the dispute—regarding whether the federal 
government forced Humana to pay the hospital’s lower rates.180 While a 
                                                                                                                     
to meet the prerequisite for suit under Florida law, class members were not required to have 
submitted individual claims).
173. Sacred Heart Health Sys., 2008 WL 2385506, at *2.
174. Id.
175. See id.
176. Id. Here, the court discusses both Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 
2006), and Lance v. Wade, 457 So. 2d 1008 (Fla. 1984). Without mentioning American Pipe, the
court in Engle allowed plaintiffs to proceed with their individual claims within one year after their 
claims were remanded following decertification. Engle, 945 So. 2d at 1277. Similarly, the court 
in Lance allowed plaintiffs to proceed individually within a reasonable time, after having relied 
on a class action. Lance, 457 So. 2d at 1011.
177. Sacred Heart Health Sys., 2008 WL 2385506, at *3.
178. Sacred Heart Health Sys. v. Humana Military Healthcare Servs., No. 3:07cv62/MCR, 
2008 WL 9359957 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 25, 2008) (granting motion for class certification), rev’d, 601 
F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2010).
179. Sacred Heart Health Sys. v. Humana Military Healthcare Servs., 601 F.3d 1159, 1164 
(11th Cir. 2010).
180. Id.
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comprehensive review of the court’s reasoning for denying class 
certification is unimportant for the purposes of this Note, it must be 
mentioned that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
concluded that the existence of many uncommon questions raised by the 
litigations rendered the cause unsuitable for class treatment.181
Because the trial court decision regarding tolling only dealt with the 
plaintiff’s existing individual claims, and class certification of this 
lawsuit was ultimately denied, the waters of Florida equitable tolling and 
class actions have been muddied. However, even in light of the trial 
court’s decision in Sacred Heart, it remains likely that Florida courts 
would generally be unwilling to extend the American Pipe rule to class 
plaintiffs’ statutes of limitations. While a Florida court has not yet 
interpreted the potential role that Sacred Heart could play in the future of 
class actions,182 the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina, 
while interpreting Florida law, rejected the plaintiffs’ attempt to use 
Sacred Heart as a means to toll the limitations period for a class action 
filed in the Middle District of Florida based on diversity jurisdiction.183
In determining whether the period could be tolled during the pendency of 
an earlier class action filed in the Northern District of Illinois, the court 
first stated what has been made abundantly clear throughout this Note—
that American Pipe only applies to a “subsequently filed federal question 
action . . . during the pendency of a federal class action.”184 The court 
then looked to the Florida tolling statute and engaged in an analysis very 
similar to that of the cases discussed earlier in this Note.185 Based on the 
directness of the Florida tolling statute and an analysis of this case law, 
the court determined that the Florida tolling statute clearly precludes class 
action tolling.186
                                                                                                                     
181. See id.
182. While not very useful for this Note’s analysis of Florida law, it should be noted that the 
court in Pierson v. Orlando Regional Healthcare Systems rejected the plaintiff’s argument that 
equitable tolling should apply to his entirely individual claim. No. 6:08-cv-466-Orl-28GJK, 2010 
WL 1408391, at *5 n.19 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 6, 2010). In doing so, the court distinguished the instant 
case from Sacred Heart because, unlike the instant case, Sacred Heart was, in part, a class action 
lawsuit. Id. The Pierson court further distinguished its case by citing to HCA Health’s statement 
that “class actions are treated differently under Florida Law,” and therefore any form of class 
action tolling could not be applied. Id. Therefore, with respect to Sacred Heart, Florida law simply 
tells us that class actions receive different treatment than individual claims, which does not 
manifest the nonambiguous rule this Note seeks regarding American Pipe tolling in Florida. 
183. Dineen v. Pella Corp., No. 2:14-mn-00001-DCN, 2015 WL 6688040 (D.S.C. Oct. 30, 
2015).
184. See id. at *3 (alteration in original) (quoting Wade v. Danek Med., Inc., 182 F.3d 281, 
286 (4th Cir. 1999)).
185. See id. 
186. See id. 
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The court thus rejected the plaintiffs’ reliance on Sacred Heart. The 
court explained that Sacred Heart’s holding was based solely on the two 
Florida Supreme Court cases that do not discuss the Florida tolling statute 
or class action tolling.187 The court stated that this precedent only permits 
putative class members to file individual state law claims within a 
proscribed amount of time, after the class action is dissolved.188 The court 
reasoned that because the precedent relied on by Sacred Heart did not 
indicate that cross-jurisdictional tolling was adopted, Florida law does 
not allow cross-jurisdictional tolling and therefore the plaintiffs’ claims 
were not tolled by the pendency of the prior action.189 Even after 
considering the ambiguities created by Sacred Heart, it is clear that 
Florida law does not offer class action tolling in any form—through 
statute or equity. 
III. TOLLING SOLUTIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
While an in depth analysis of how every state and federal jurisdiction 
has handled class action tolling is well beyond the scope of this Note, it 
is beneficial to take a brief look at how several states have incorporated 
American Pipe tolling into their laws. Of the states that have addressed 
class action tolling, the “overwhelming majority” have adopted it in their 
own jurisdictions.190 However, significantly fewer states have addressed 
the issue of cross-jurisdictional tolling.191 Therefore, one way that states 
have addressed the tolling issue is through the common law. Ohio serves 
as an example of a jurisdiction that has resolved this issue in favor of 
cross-jurisdictional tolling, with the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in 
Vaccariello v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc.192 Here, the court 
determined that because Ohio’s class action rule was virtually identical 
to Federal Rule 23, a class action filed in either state or federal court 
served the same purpose.193 Therefore, the defendant was put on equal 
notice, regardless of whether the class action was first filed in state or 
federal court.194 The court found that permitting this federal class action 
                                                                                                                     
187. See id. at *4.
188. See id.
189. See id.
190. Gerald D. Jowers, Jr., The Class Stops the Clock: Some Injured People Don’t Consider 
Litigation Until It Seems Too Late. But a Decades-Old Supreme Court Decision May Help You 
Save an Apparently Time Barred Claim, TRIAL, Nov. 2005, at 18, 22.
191. Id. The issue of cross-jurisdictional tolling arises in two contexts—“whether a federal 
class action involving state law claims can toll a state’s statute of limitations and whether a class 
action pending in one state can toll the statute of limitations in another.” Id.
192. 763 N.E. 2d 160 (Ohio 2002).
193. Jowers, supra note 190, at 23.
194. Id.
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to toll the state limitations period did not defeat Ohio’s purposes in its 
own class action rule.195 Therefore, tolling was permitted.
Beyond the policy rationales discussed by the court in favor of 
tolling,196 it is important to note that the similarity of Ohio’s class action 
rule to Federal Rule 23 weighed heavily on the court’s decision.197 This 
contrasts with the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation of Virginia law, which 
determined that the lack of an analogous state class action statute to 
Federal Rule 23 pointed to the state’s reluctance to adopt federal 
tolling.198 Additionally, unlike Ohio, the Fourth Circuit noted that 
Virginia law disfavored equitable tolling and required courts to strictly 
construe its statutes of limitations.199 Finally, and of utmost importance 
for the proposed solution of this Note, Ohio has a savings statute200 that 
permits plaintiffs to bring a new action within one year.201
Many state legislatures have enacted savings statutes, in addition to 
tolling statutes, which provide a plaintiff with a proscribed amount of 
additional time to refile a claim after the standard limitations period has 
run.202 However, to be eligible for this additional time, the plaintiff must 
have either originally filed a timely suit that was terminated on procedural 
grounds or obtained a favorable final judgment that was reversed on 
appeal for procedural grounds.203 In pertinent part, section (A) of the 
Ohio savings statute provides that in any action that is commenced, “if in 
due time a judgment for the plaintiff is reversed or if the plaintiff fails 
otherwise than upon the merits,” then plaintiff, or his representative if he 
dies, can “commence a new action within one year after the date of the 
reversal of the judgment or the plaintiff’s failure otherwise than upon the 
merits.”204 Section (A) also states that it applies to any claim asserted by 
the defendant in a pleading.205 Section (B) of the Ohio savings statute 
provides for the appropriate action to take if the defendant described in 
                                                                                                                     
195. Id.
196. Id. at 23–25. The court also stated that forum shopping would not become an issue after 
its holding, because allowing for tolling was now only permitted for plaintiffs who could have 
originally filed in Ohio. Id. Additionally, the court reasoned that a contrary holding would 
discourage Ohio class action members from relying on the original action, as well as encourage 
the class members to file protective lawsuits in Ohio state courts. Id.
197. Id. at 25. 
198. Id. at 23 (citing Wade v. Danek Med., Inc., 182 F.3d 281, 287 (4th Cir. 1999)).
199. See id. at 25.
200. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.19 (LexisNexis 2016).
201. Jowers, supra note 190, at 25. 
202. See Wasserman, supra note 60, at 815. “In a 1965 opinion, the Supreme Court identified 
thirty-one state savings statutes.” Id. at 815 n.44 (citing Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 
431–32 n.9 (1964)).
203. Id. at 815.
204. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.19(A).
205. Id.
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section (A) is a foreign or domestic corporation.206 Section (C) of the 
statute provides for sections of the Ohio code that are not affected by the 
savings statute.207
The New York Legislature has also enacted a savings statute, which 
similarly provides that “[i]f an action is timely commenced and is 
terminated in any other manner than by a voluntary discontinuance, a 
failure to obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendant, a dismissal of 
the complaint for neglect to prosecute the action, or a final judgment upon 
the merits,” the plaintiff can commence a new action within six months 
of the termination.208 Section (b) of the statute provides for the timeliness 
of a defendant’s assertion of a cause of action or defense when the action 
is terminated in any manner, as long as the assertion was timely made in 
the original action.209 Finally, section (c) provides that the savings statute 
is applicable to claims brought under workers’ compensation law.210
The Connecticut Legislature has also enacted a savings statute211
similar to that of Ohio and New York. Like the other two savings statutes 
examined, section (a) provides that if any action, originally commenced 
in a timely manner, has been dismissed for want of jurisdiction, the 
plaintiff may commence a new action “for the same cause at any time 
within one year after the determination of the original action.”212 Section 
(b) of the statute decreases the additional limitations period to six months 
for an action brought or continued against an executor after the death of 
the defendant.213 Section (c) provides for a limitation on additional time 
allotted for an appeal from a judgment from the Supreme Court or 
Appellate Court.214 Section (d) applies the statute’s provisions to 
defendants who file a cross complaint, to actions between the same 
parties, and to an action brought to the U.S. circuit or district court for the 
District of Connecticut that was dismissed “without trial upon its merits 
or because of lack of jurisdiction in such court.”215 Either the date of 
dismissal or the determination of the appeal commences the time period 
to bring the action in state court.216 Finally, the last section of the 
Connecticut savings statute permits it to apply to timely filed claims 
against the state.217
                                                                                                                     
206. Id. § 2305.19(B).
207. Id. § 2305.19(C).
208. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 205(a) (McKinney 2016).
209. Id. § 205(b).
210. Id. § 205(c).
211. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-592 (2016).
212. Id. § 52-592(a).
213. Id. § 52-592(b).
214. Id. § 52-592(c).
215. Id. § 52-592(d).
216. Id.
217. Id. § 52-592(e).
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IV. PROPOSAL
As has been extensively discussed, Florida courts reject American 
Pipe tolling. Although Sacred Heart provides a glimmer of hope for 
tolling, its decision does not encompass the class action tolling needed to 
remedy the statutes of limitations issues that were created by CAFA and 
the Florida class action statutes, which expanded federal jurisdiction for 
these claims. Even if Sacred Heart represented the current law in Florida, 
this decision only stands for tolling of the individual class members’ 
claims, not for the class action as a whole. Additionally, the recent 
rejection of Sacred Heart’s holding by a court interpreting Florida law 
indicates that class tolling, except as specifically enumerated by the 
Florida tolling statute, is not the law in Florida. Florida law has also never 
addressed the issue of cross-jurisdictional tolling, which if addressed by 
a court could solve this issue. A major problem exists for the justice 
system any time a plaintiff is left without his or her rights adjudicated. 
Because Florida courts have failed to assimilate any form of American 
Pipe or equitable tolling into Florida law, the Florida legislature must 
consider this issue.
Unique to this issue in Florida is the lack of notice that the issue itself 
provides to the body that has the capability of fashioning a solution. As 
discussed in HCA Health, the Florida Constitution gives the judiciary the 
power to establish rules for the transfer of cases from a court without 
jurisdiction to a court with jurisdiction.218 The court in HCA Health
discussed the impact of this proposition, which is vital to the proposed 
solution of this Note. Because the power has been in the hands of the 
judiciary to solve this issue, without piecing together the cases analyzed 
within this Note, the Legislature has never been confronted with the class 
action tolling issue. Therefore, it is extremely likely that the Florida 
Legislature has been without notice of this problem for class plaintiffs. 
This Note serves as a notice to the Legislature that something must be 
done to resolve the issue of class action tolling in Florida. 
As a solution to this issue, the Florida Legislature should adopt a 
savings statute, which would toll the limitations period so that plaintiffs 
could pursue their actions after the statute of limitations has run. This 
savings statute should specifically allow the class action to be reinstated 
in the proper state court, notwithstanding the running of the limitations 
period, after it is dismissed from federal court for lack of jurisdiction. An 
adequate savings statute could be modeled after another state’s savings 
statute that was enacted to address this same issue. This Note incorporates 
the three states’ savings statutes discussed in Part III, New York, 
Connecticut, and Ohio, to create a proposed statute for adoption by the 
                                                                                                                     
218. See HCA Health Servs. of Fla., Inc. v. Hillman, 906 So. 2d 1094, 1099 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2004) (citing FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a)).
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Florida Legislature. A savings statute, similar to the three analyzed above 
in Part III, is detailed below for the Legislature’s consideration:
(1) In any action, commenced within the time limited by 
law, if in due judgment for the plaintiff is reversed or if 
the plaintiff fails otherwise than upon the merits, or is 
terminated in any other manner than by a voluntary 
discontinuance,219 a failure to obtain personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant, the plaintiff, or if the 
plaintiff dies and the cause of action survives, the 
plaintiff’s representative or administrator, may continue 
a new action upon the same transaction or occurrence, or 
series of transactions or occurrences, within one year220
after the termination provided that the new action would 
have been timely commenced at the time of 
commencement of the prior action.221
Moreover, similar to what other states have done, the Florida 
Legislature could add additional provisions that are particularly 
applicable to Florida law. Such additional provisions may take the form 
of limiting the savings statute to address class action lawsuits specifically. 
This would limit the Legislature’s hesitance toward adopting what may 
be considered an overbroad statute. When considered in light of Florida’s 
tolling statute already in existence, the proposed legislation fulfills the 
same policy concerns addressed and resolved by the tolling statute—
essentially, it is unjust for plaintiffs in a class, who have a valid claim of 
right under the law, to be limited from pursuing this right because of 
faults outside of their control. In fact, the proposed statute actually 
mirrors the underlying motives of several of the provisions of the current 
Florida tolling statute. 
As outlined in Part II of this Note, the Florida statute allows for tolling 
of the limitations period when a person is absent from the state222 or 
concealed so that process cannot be served on the defendant.223 In writing 
                                                                                                                     
219. It should be noted that if the Legislature chooses to add a direct mention of class action 
tolling to the statute, this would be an appropriate location to place a statement identifying whether 
the Legislature wishes to allow for tolling after class decertification. Because class certification is 
outside the realm of this Note, it should be stated that this Note does not advocate for the tolling
of the limitations period when class certification is at issue.
220. This time period should be determined by the Florida Legislature. The suggestion of 
one year originates from the Connecticut and Ohio savings statutes. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-592(a) 
(2016); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.19(A) (LexisNexis 2016). However, as indicated above, 
New York provides a savings period of six months. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 205(a) (McKinney 2016).
221. This statute is comprised of language originating from the savings statutes of New York, 
Connecticut, and Ohio. 
222. FLA. STAT. § 95.051(1)(a) (2016).
223. Id. § 95.051(1)(c).
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this statute, the Legislature wished for plaintiffs to have an opportunity 
to pursue their claims when situations arise that are completely out of 
their control, such as the absence of the defendant from the state. 
Similarly, class plaintiffs, when integrated into a class of hundreds or 
thousands of other individuals, absolutely cannot change the often 
detrimental impact of situations, completely outside of their control, that 
alter a litigation plan. The statute of limitations issue can create one such 
situation. Therefore, the Legislature’s adoption of the suggested savings 
statute will address the same policy concerns that were considered in the 
creation of the Florida tolling statute.
In its adoption of this savings statute, the Florida Legislature should 
adopt a line of reasoning similar to that of the Ohio case law analyzed in 
Part III of this Note. Notably, the court in Sacred Heart used this 
reasoning in an attempt to allow class action tolling in Florida. In its 
consideration of the proposed savings statute, the Legislature’s line of 
reasoning should follow this progression: Class actions are valuable 
methods of pursuing causes of actions in both state and federal courts. 
These lawsuits prevent multiplicity of suits, make legal processes more 
efficient and effective, and make remedies available to plaintiffs who 
would otherwise be left without remedy.224 Both federal courts and 
Florida state courts share these same values in permitting class action 
litigation. It follows that the Florida class action rule is very similar to 
Federal Rule 23. Further, within the federal forum, courts have adopted 
the American Pipe rule to toll the statute of limitations period. Like in the 
federal forum, Florida values class actions. Because the Florida 
Legislature has created a statute that further intermingles the federal and 
state forums when it comes to class action jurisdiction,225 Florida should 
thus be obliged to adopt a form of tolling similar to that of American Pipe
and its progeny. This is especially significant when considering the vast 
number of cases that flood federal courts, thanks to CAFA and the 
corresponding Florida statute increasing federal jurisdiction for class 
actions, which permits the limitations period to run on otherwise 
meritorious claims. However, because Florida case law has opposed the 
notion of class action tolling, the Legislature is now responsible for 
adopting a savings statute to remedy this problem.
Florida’s adoption of this proposed savings statute is the best method 
to solve the statute of limitations issue for many reasons. First, Florida 
already has a tolling statute, so the addition of a savings statute follows 
the Legislature’s motives of bringing justice to plaintiffs who deserve to 
have their rights adjudicated. Additionally, this solution should appeal to 
                                                                                                                     
224. Sacred Heart Health Sys. v. Humana Military Healthcare Serv., No. 3:07cv62/MCR, 
2008 WL 2385506, at *1 (N.D. Fla. June 9, 2008) (quoting Tenney v. City of Miami Beach, 11 
So. 2d 188, 189 (Fla. 1942)).
225. FLA. STAT. § 768.734.
30
Florida Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol69/iss3/7
2017] FLORIDA CLASS ACTION JURISDICTION 1019
the Florida Legislature, because it simply advocates for tolling of the 
limitations period when it has run for jurisdictional reasons. Based on the 
specifics of the Florida tolling statute, the Legislature values tolling the 
limitations period for policy reasons similar to those underlying class 
action tolling for a misidentification of proper jurisdiction. Because 
proper jurisdiction is the only issue, the Legislature will not be required 
to consider any additional issues in the complex web of class action 
litigation when deciding whether to adopt this savings statute.
Moreover, it remains important to weigh the considerations of 
Florida’s adoption of a savings statute and the consequences that this 
might have on the justice system. Statutes of limitations are important in 
litigation, as they balance many different competing interests.226 Five 
important policy reasons underlie statutes of limitations. First, without a
statute of limitations, defendants would always worry about their 
potential liability and constantly have to preserve evidence to defend 
themselves.227 Second, “statutes of limitations protect courts from the 
obligation to adjudicate state claims with the attendant risks of lost 
evidence, absent witnesses, fading memories, and ultimately, inaccurate 
fact-finding.”228 Third, statutes of limitations help the judicial system by 
limiting the amount of claims that can be filed.229 Fourth, as expressed in 
the case law analyzed within this Note, statutes of limitations keep 
plaintiffs from sleeping on their rights.230 Finally, legislative skepticism 
may be reflected through the creation of short statutes of limitations.231
This Note agrees that the policy concerns of statutes of limitations are 
important aspects of the legal system. However, when they merely 
function as a means to keep plaintiffs from having their legal claims heard 
because of procedural flaws, the value of statutes of limitations becomes 
greatly decreased in light of the high value of a plaintiff’s right to bring 
his otherwise meritorious claim into the justice system. Therefore, once 
the Florida Legislature is made aware of the negative impact that statutes 
of limitations are having on plaintiffs in class action jurisdiction mishaps, 
the Legislature should agree that the policy goals it considered with 
respect to statutes of limitations when creating the Florida tolling statute 
certainly apply to the class actions described within this Note.
CONCLUSION
After considering the gravity of the issue of stranding class plaintiffs 
without any means to adjudicate their rights, it seems only logical that the 
                                                                                                                     
226. See Wasserman, supra note 60, at 811.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 811–12.
229. See id. at 812.
230. See id.
231. See id.
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Legislature should intervene in this area of law where Florida courts are 
unwilling to do so. As classes become larger, more individuals are at risk 
of not having their rights adjudicated. When considered with the 
difficulties that CAFA and the subsequent Florida class action legislation 
have created in determining a class action’s proper jurisdiction from the
outset of its filing, the Florida Legislature must enact a savings statute to 
remedy the limitations issue. Without accounting for class action tolling 
in the Florida tolling statute or integrating American Pipe into Florida 
law, Florida class action plaintiffs are at a severe risk of losing their 
otherwise viable claims unless the Florida Legislature finally answers the 
call to toll for the Sacred Heart, and follows the lead of other states that 
have adopted savings statutes to remedy this procedural issue.
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